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In late December 2025, two seemingly unrelated developments collided in global headlines. First, Pakistan signed a multi-billion-dollar defence agreement with forces in eastern Libya. Days later, a Libyan military aircraft crashed near Ankara, killing the entire top command of Libya’s western, UN-backed armed forces.
Almost immediately, social media and commentary spaces began drawing a straight line between the two events—suggesting assassinations, arms-lobby retaliation, or covert power plays involving Pakistan’s military leadership. But geopolitics is rarely that simple.
Libya Is Not One State — It Is Two Competing Power Centres
?? Primer: The Two Libyas
| WEST (Tripoli) | EAST (Tobruk/Benghazi) |
|---|---|
| Govt: GNU (UN-backed) | Govt: House of Representatives |
| Military: Western Armed Forces | Military: LNA (Khalifa Haftar) |
| Status: Leadership killed in crash | Status: Signed deal with Pakistan |
To understand what actually happened—and what did not—one must first understand Libya’s fractured power structure. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has existed in a prolonged state of political bifurcation.
In the east, large swathes of territory are controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar. This faction operates largely outside the UN-recognised political framework.
In the west, centred around Tripoli, power lies with the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU). These two structures are rivals, not partners. Any analysis that treats “Libya” as a single, unified military actor immediately collapses under scrutiny.
The Pakistan–Libya Defence Deal: What Is Verified
On December 22, 2025, Reuters reported that Pakistan had signed a defence deal worth over $4 billion with Haftar-led eastern Libyan forces, despite Libya being under a UN arms embargo. The deal reportedly includes JF-17 fighter jets, trainer aircraft, ammunition, and naval and ground equipment.
Crucially, this agreement was not signed with the Tripoli-based GNU or its armed forces. It was concluded with eastern Libya. This distinction matters—because the officers who died days later did not belong to Haftar’s faction.
? The Timeline of Events
- ?? Dec 22, 2025: Pakistan signs defense deal with Eastern Libya (Haftar).
- ?? Dec 23, 2025: Plane carrying Western Libya’s military command crashes in Turkey.
- ?? Dec 24, 2025: Social media erupts with unverified theories linking the two.
- ?? Current: Turkey investigates electrical failure; no foul play found yet.
The Plane Crash: What We Know for Certain
On December 23, 2025, a Falcon 50 jet carrying senior Libyan military officials crashed shortly after take-off from Ankara’s Esenbo?a Airport. Killed in the crash was Mohammed Ali Ahmed Al-Haddad, Chief of Staff of Libya’s armed forces aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity.
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Turkish authorities stated there was no foul play, attributing the crash to an electrical malfunction. The black box and cockpit voice recorder were recovered and are under investigation.
Why the “Pakistan Did This” Narrative Falls Apart
The most viral claim following the crash was that the Libyan official killed was connected to the Pakistan defence deal—and that his death was meant to derail or punish the agreement. This is factually incorrect.
The defence deal was signed with Haftar’s eastern faction. The crash killed the western faction’s leadership. As several analysts pointed out, the factions involved are opponents, not allies. Even critics of Pakistan’s military establishment acknowledged that Al-Haddad had no role whatsoever in the eastern Libya deal.
The Real Strategic Consequence — Without Conspiracies
What is undeniably true is this: Western Libya lost nearly its entire senior military leadership in a single incident. The Tripoli-based GNU already relied on fragile militia coalitions. With its command structure decapitated, internal instability is almost inevitable.
Meanwhile, eastern Libya—already armed, financed, and increasingly legitimised through foreign engagement—faces a strategic opening. This imbalance may alter Libya’s internal power trajectory, regardless of how the crash occurred. That outcome does not require secret plots. Structural weakness alone is enough.
